




How the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional Moved Nicaragua from 
Somoza to Democracy  




 From 1937 to 1979, the country of Nicaragua was effectively ruled by one family, the Somoza family, 
approximating a hereditary dictatorship. Although members of the family ruled under the title of “President,” the 
regime was a far cry from any semblance of a democracy. In his article “Sandinista Nicaragua as a Deweyan Social 
Experiment,” Joseph Betz emphatically characterizes the Somoza family as “cruel and greedy autocrats” (Betz 25). 
As unrest with systematic oppression grew, so did the strength of the primary opposition campaign, fronted by the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a leftist party founded on socialist theories. In July 1979, the Junta of 
National Reconstruction, a five-member committee of FSLN leaders officially became the ruling power of 
Nicaragua by removing Somoza from office. In the Presidential election of November 1984, called “the cleanest 
held in Nicaragua since 1928” by the U.S. Latin American Studies Association, the Junta ceded power without 
protest to President-elect Daniel Ortega (Betz 26).  
In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, the authors note that Nicaragua’s successful “installation and 
consolidation of democracy,” transitioning from an autocratic regime to a political democracy, is unique in that it 
was the result of a bloody “‘overthrow of power’ by implacable antagonists,” a typically impossible scenario 
(O'Donnell and Schmitter 11). Because Nicaragua’s democratization process manifested in a unique manner wholly 
distinct from the paradigm of democratization embodied in countries like the United States, detractors conclude that 
it cannot fit the archetype of what a democracy intrinsically is and thus classify the Nicaraguan Revolution as an 
installation of a competitive authoritarian regime. In “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”, the authors argue 
that FSLN’s loss of power to the opposition party, the Constitutionalist Liberation Party (PLC), in 1990 marks 
Nicaragua’s transitional moment from a competitive authoritarian regime to democratization (Levitsky and Way 59-
60). Thomas Carothers’s article “The End of the Transition Paradigm” decries Nicaragua as a “grey area;” their 
democratic aims are tarnished by what he defines as “feckless pluralism,” a condition wherein corrupt elites within 
each party have complete dominion over the trajectory of the country such that the public has little influence in 
social and political affairs aside from their ability to elect members of the corrupt, partisan elite to positions of 
power (Carothers 7).  But, Carothers’s “feckless pluralism” could apply to many countries universally deemed 
“democratic,” like the US, such that it cannot appropriately be framed as an indication of a “grey” democracy. 
The reality of an entirely peaceful shift in power from FSLN to PLC compels the notion that Nicaraguan 
democratization began with the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty, not FSLN’s loss in the 1990 election – the FSLN 
only resorted to violent insurrection because it was the only viable recourse for the public in pursuit of gaining 
political voice due to Somoza’s systematic dereliction of legal alternatives to regime change and stifling of free 
speech (Serra 24). The 1984 election was conducted in a free and fair manner with a significant percentage of the 
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electorate participating, the 1987 constitution drafted by elected officials in the Legislative branch of the 
government “combined Western liberal democratic norms with a revolutionary social conscience” (Prevost 309),and 
opposition parties were able to gain power through electoral means; therefore, the democratization of Nicaragua 
should be denoted as initiating with the removal of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979 and ending with the 
implementation of the Nicaraguan Constitution in 1987. It may be argued that the Junta of National Reconstruction 
was a non-democratic entity during the transition period before the first election (1979-1984): it gained power 
without popular elections yet still passed legislation, fitting the “pact” construct of an undemocratic institution that 
facilitates the movement of a polity toward democracy after removal of a dictator (O'Donnell and Schmitter 38). 
Concurrently, the Nicaraguan Revolution was successful because FSLN and the Junta of National 
Reconstruction, although not democratically elected to power, had the support of the critical mass of Nicaragua’s 
citizenry. As delineated by Rustow Dankwart in Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, unity of the 
citizenry is the preeminent background condition for democratization (Rustow 351).Citizenry, he opines, is unified 
by two concrete factors: existence of struggle and unification of national ideology (Rustow 355).Though Dankwart 
referred to struggle as between socioeconomic classes, the Nicaraguan Revolution was less concerned with class 
struggle and more with struggle against authoritarianism. Yet, capitalist structures in Nicaragua contributed to “la 
polarización capitalista de las clases…donde el proletariado y la burguesia aun en proceso de diferenciación respect 
de estos agentes de desarrollo social” or the polarization and differentiation between the bourgeois and proletariat 
classes in the realm of social strata development (Vilas 126). Rampant nepotism and favoritism defined the Somoza 
regime and eventually alienated many in the private sector (Gorman 149), cultivating a unanimous hatred for 
Somoza that allowed FSLN to “build bridges” between the bourgeoisie and proletariat and fashion a cohesive 
opposition front despite pervading class antagonisms (Cuzán 78). The culmination of class unification against a 
common enemy was the diversity of the background of insurrection participants: about 29% were students, 22% 
craftsmen, 16% journalists, 16% clerical workers, 7% professors and degree holders, 5% traders, 4.5% farmers, and 
.5% other (Vilas 131). 
The eccentric composition of members of the insurrection was also the result of two major events that made 
Somoza “algo asi como el ‘enemigo ideal’…profundamente corrupto y crecientemente represivo” (Vilas 139) or the 
perfect enemy and embodiment of oppressive regime and corruption: the assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, 
a popular and vocal opponent of the Somoza regime, and the  response to the 1972 earthquake wherein Somoza 
abused foreign aid by employing his own companies to aid the rebuilding effort and purchasing large expanses of 
damaged land for under-market value for his own personal fiduciary gain (Cuzán 80). Whereas FSLN was founded 
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in the early 1960s, these two events allowed the party to win the favor of the people and buoyed a mass movement 
motivated by extreme discontent. The blight of the Somoza family fostered “a crisis of legitimacy” for the dynasty, 
leading to a “crisis of change” as is delineated by Lipset (Lipset 87).  
Faction groups rallied under the FSLN banner because FSLN’s assisted the groups on a grassroots level 
such that both FSLN and the organizations could better achieve their goals; thus, small grassroots groups were able 
to effectively influence the trajectory of FSLN ideology and, by proxy, their future actions. FSLN repaid these 
groups by creating laws; for example, a law that guaranteed the right to strike and collective bargain, causing 
unionization to skyrocket from 10% of the workforce under Somoza in 1979 to over 55% by the end of the 1980s 
(Prevost 308).Education-oriented groups were elated by the promise and eventual actualization of a reversal of the 
low illiteracy and adult education rates under Somoza; under the FSLN, adult education rose from 0 in 1978 to 
194,800 persons in 1984 and literacy from 50% to 87% of the population (Betz 34). In exchange for female 
supporters, FSLN initiated various services that, by 1994, reached at least 108,000 women by 1994, and toiled to 
facilitate movement toward gender equality previously stagnated by the staunch Catholic Agenda of Somoza 
(Prevost 318-319). FSLN’s “highly disruptive…operations” prior to the overthrow of Somoza were publicized in the 
media, instilling revolutionary spirit even in those disconnected from grassroots movements and bringing them fully 
into the FSLN fold. 
If “one year of economic crisis is enough to produce the political effects” of destabilizing a regime 
(Limongi and Przeworski 169), then it is surprising that the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty did not occur sooner. 
In an agrarian economy like Nicaragua’s, misdistribution of land has particularly dire consequences since land 
allocation essentially defines the distribution of wealth for a majority of the population. Ergo, the discontent 
regarding the extreme and growing gap between the relatively few wealthy and poor was intensified by the Somoza 
family and its associates owning “20% of the agricultural land and 33% of the non-agricultural businesses” (Betz 
34) and, ergo, holding a large portion of the key to wealth and social mobility. Legitimacy was bestowed on FSLN 
as a result of its creation of institutions “proper…for the society” (Lipset 87) that aimed to benefit the populace in 
contrast to the grave errs of the Somoza regime. By illustrating the benefits of change to the mass of nonbelievers in 
the populace through consistent action, support for FSLN spread and manufactured an infectious yearning for 
democracy. During the transitional period and first FSLN presidency, Nicaraguans witnessed the potential impact 
that the voice of a population can confer on the course of their country. Since 1984, Nicaraguans have been able to 
go to the polls and chose leaders that they believe will best usher Nicaragua into an era of greater social and 




Betz, Joseph. "Sandinista Nicaragua as a Deweyan Social Experiment." Transactions of the Charles S. 
Peirce Society 36.1 (2000): 25-47. Article. 
Carothers, Thomas. "The End of the Transition Paradigm." Journal of Democracy 13.1 (2002): 5-21. 
Article. 
Cuzán, Alfred G. "Resource Mobilization and Political Opportunity in the Nicaraguan Revolution: The 
Praxis." American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 50.1 (1991): 71-83. 
Gorman, Stephen M. "Power and Consolidation in the Nicaraguan Revolution." Journal of Latin American 
Studies 13.1 (1981): 133-149. Article. 
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. "Democracy Without Elections: The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism." Journal of Democracy 13.2 (2002): 51-65. Article. 
Limongi, Fernando and Adam Przeworski. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." World Politics 49.2 
(1997): 155-183. Article. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy." The American Political Science Review 53.1 (1959): 69-105. Article. 
O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Book. 
Prevost, Gary. "The Nicaraguan Revolution: Six Years after the Sandinista Electoral Defeat." Third World 
Quarterly 17.2 (1996): 207-327. Article. 
Rustow, Dankwart A. "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." Comparative Politics 2.3 
(1970): 337-363. Article. 
Serra, Luis. "Democracy in Times of War and Socialist Crisis: Reflections Stemming from the Sandinista 
Revolution." Latin American Perspectives 20.2 (1993): 21-44. Article. 
Vilas, Carlos M. "El Sujeto Social de la Insurreccion Popular: La Revolucion Sandinista." Latin American 
Research Review 20.1 (1985): 119-147. Article. 
 
 
